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CACIQUISMO IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN EJIDO-GRANT COMMUNITIES

Introduction
Caciquismo, or political bossism, is a type of autocratic political
organization which has been prevalent in rural agrarian Mexico for over
400 years.
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It has been especially noted in communities which have had

corporate landholding, i.e., where title to the agricultural, pasture,
and woodlands has been held by the community and usufruct rights to
these l an ds have been granted to community members.

Cac i quismo e x ists

in this type of community when one indiv i dua l, with the h e lp of a sma ll
group of followers, controls the economic, political, and sometimes
even the social activity of the members of that community.

He gains

and maintains control through various means - patronage, coercion, cooptation, violence, etc.

Tracts have been written explaining why commun-

ities with this form of land tenure arrangement have been prey to autocratic, or cacique rule in previous centuries (e.g., Gibson 1964; Silva
Herzog 1959; Tannenbaum 1929).

It is not so clear, however, why many

post-Revolution (post-1917) communities in which the majority of land
" un der eJ1
""d 0 grant 3
1S

are still under cacique rule, for many parts of

the 1917 Constitution and subsequent laws purposefully built a democratic form into the government of these communities.
It is my contention that caciquismo has continued to exist in twentieth-century Mexican ejido communities which are by law organized according to democratic principles largely because of two factors.

First,

while many parts of the 1917 Constitution and subsequent agararian laws
were written to insure democratic organization of the ejido community,
some of the laws could be interpreted or subverted to allow for auto-
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cratic organization, or caciquismo, of the ejido.

Second, certain impli-

cations of the Post-Revolution Mexican political structure, which is
characterized by the one-party system, further

increas~

the possibility

that caciquismo will continue in ejido communities.
I plan to demonstrate the first point by carefully inspecting the
laws and examining case studies of ejido communities which are or recently have been controlled by caciques.

These case studies were reported

by other anthropologists who worked in all parts of Mexico from the 1930's
to the early 1970's.

Analysis of the laws reveals where and how certain

sections can be misinterpreted or subverted so that individuals can achieve
and maintain autocratic rule.

Examination of case studies points out

how actual individuals managed to do so.

I will consider the second point

by analyzing the implications of modern political structure on ejido community political organization and by presenting case studies of caciques
in ejido communities.

While the former analysis indicates the logical

implications of the national political structure for the ejido community,
the latter is intended to illustrate that some of these implications have
been explicitly used by individuals in such communities.
Analysis of the legal system has been based on the laws themselves
while analysis of the political structure is my own rethinking of that
structure, thinking which has been influenced by some anthropologists,
political scientists, and economists

(e.g., Simpson 1937; Padgett 1966;

Hansen 1971). Actual case studies of caciques are used to demonstrate
both points because they best illustrate the implications of the laws and
national political structure for the ejido political structure.

While

a more powerful argument could be made if I contrasted ejido communities
with caciques to ejido communities without caciques, I can rarely be sure
that reports of cacique-less communities actually meant that the ejido
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was free of caciquismo.

The literature often ignores

Cor fails to clear-

ly spell out) the political structure when describing the government organization of the community or area studied.
It will be noted that the case studies are based on life histories
of one or several individuals living in ejido communities Cover the 50year period since the end of the Revolution).

These life histories are

meant to demonstrate that the logic in this analysis is more than my own
creation but is acted upon by individuals in ejido communities.

Such

studies also give this analysis its basic orientation, i.e., both the
political and legal structures are analyzed from the point of view of
the individual seeking to play the c a cique rule in an ejido community.
By using this point of view, one can see that the national political structure and some laws make it easy for some individuals to achieve the
cacique status.
The roles which he lp one achieve cacique status may be categorized
into three types.

These are:

(a) broker between the local administra-

tive unit and higher levels of politico-government organ.i.zation, Cb)
patron to the majority of people within the local unit, and Cc) leader
of a power group.

Anyone performing all three roles for the community

at one time in a corporate landholding community controls the politics,
economy, and government of that community and is the cacique of the com-·
munity.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that in some of the anthropological literature on caciquismo, authors will state that there is
more than one cacique in an administrative unit at one time because the
people under investigation refer to more than one individual as 'cacique'
(Lewis 1951; Siverts 1965).

I believe that this is confusing the folk

usage with an analytical term.

In a true cacicazgo, there may be
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sever al strong leaders in an administrative unit, but only one is the
cacique.

If there is no one leader, then chances are that the several

leaders are competing for that status.

This distinction is not mine but

can be found in much of the literature (Dunwell 1965; Foster 1948; Cancian
1965) .
In sum, in order to understand how caciquismo has continued to exist in many ejido communities in twentieth-century Mexico despite laws
and a Constitution which have sought to establish a democratic political
structure there, I plan to examine caciquismo as the process of status
attainment, maintenance, and loss.

Examination of the laws concerning

the operation of the ejido communit y and t h e n ational political structure
coupled with case studies of caciques in the anthropological literature
i ndicates that these laws and the national political structure make it
possible for one individual to pass through this process, thus caciquismo
continues to exist up to the 1970's.

I.

Implications of the National Agrarian Reform Laws for the
Achievement of Cacique Status

One of the most significant results of the Mexican Revolution was
the agrarian reform legislation begun in a Presidential decree of January
6, 1915, codified in Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, and modified
by law thereafter.

The purpose of much of this reform legislation was

to return land to the communities which had been corporate landholding
communities before the D!az regime ("restitution") or to grant land to
communities seeking to become corporate landholding units ("dotation").
Prior to the Revolution and especially during the D!az regbae, the
agrarian land tenure structure was divided in three parts.

The first

was the hacienda, or large landholding owned by one family and worked by
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peones living either on hacienda grounds or in a nearby town.

Peones

were often granted a houseplot and milpa plot for subsistence farming in
return for l ow wages and long-standing debts (McBride 1923).

The second

part was the rancho, or small landholding owned and farmed by a family
with perhaps some (often seasonal) outside help (Whetten 1948).

The third

was the 'free village,' or corporate landholding community in which title
to the pasture, wood and farmland was in the name of the village and use
of all the land was open to community members.

While pasture and woodland

were open to all, farmland was usually parcelled out to members of the
community.

Such parcels could not be sold by the individuals working

them but by a joint decis i on of all community members.
Through new legis l ation which subverted the purpose of the 1856 Constitution of Ju~rez (whiCh tried to return land to the peasants), D!az
hastened the reduction of the amount of land held by free villages and
ranchos and thereby increased the size and number of haciendas in many
parts of Mexico (Whetten 1948). The purpose of the post-Revolution agrarian
reform program was to reverse the trend of the D{az period and return farmland to the free villages and villages absorbed by the haciendas.

Resti-

tution was instituted in such a way as to establish local democratic government of these lands and to prevent
ity at a later date.

thei~

usurpation from the commun-

This was the overt reasoning behind Article 27 of

the Constitution.
While the reasoning was sound, several of the laws could be used to
help block the establishment of democracy in many ejidos.

In brief, the

legal format (established in the Constitution and subsequent laws as will
be seen later) for receiving a land grant and later economic benefits as
well as for organizing the majority of adult male members of a community
into an ejido leaves room for, if not encourages, one individual to take
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on the three roles essential to achieving cacique status, Le., the roles
of broker, leader of a power group, and patron.
The f irst role, that of broker between an ejido community and the
National Agrarian Reform organization consists of mediating between these
levels of agrarian organization.

Status associated with playing this role

places the individual at the top of the local-level political hierarchy
and intermediary between that level and the next highest level of political organization.

The political broker gains favors for himself, his fol-

lowers, and his ejido from the higher levels of the political and government organizations in his role as client to his superiors.

Here the client

guarantees political ( vo ting and phys i cal) s uppo rt to his political superiors in return for patronage, or physical and economic support for

him~

self and for political and economic benefits for the ejido he represents.
To be a client means that one is able to understand and function well
enough within these political circles in order to know what one's superiors want and to gain the favors one seeks.
The Constitution stipulates that the federal government is the sole
owner of national land and has the power to grant land to incorporated
communities whose members depend upon subsistence farming for their livelihood.

Any 'population nucleus' may petition the government for the land

grant, thus taking the initiative for land reform.

The land grant is

made not to each petitioner but to the petitioning body which is organized into an Assembly of ejidatarios led by an agrarian committee.
committee is responsible to - th,e National _Agrarian Commission
1929:

This

(T~nhel1baum

236).

The process of getting a land grant by either 'restitution' or 'dotation' may be summarized as follows:

Allor some members of a commun-

ity petition the Local Agrarian Committee for a land grant.

This
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committee consists of individuals appointed by the Governor Qf a state
to oversee land grants within the entire state.

If this board approves,

the pet ition is sent to the National Agrarian Commission in Mexico City
whi ch a l so reviews the petition.

If the commission approves, it will

recommend to the President of Mexico that he grant the petition.
by Presidential decree can a community receive a land grant.

Only

This may

take years, as a community seeking 'restitution' or 'dotation' may fight
long legal battles with the surrounding haciendas or communities.

For

example, in Cozumel, Quintana Roo, some inhabitants petitioned for a land
grant in 1928; the Presidential decree was dated 1945.

The time may be

lessened by a provisional grant f rom the Gove rnor, as it was in Cozumel.
Why is a broker necessary in securing a land grant and subsequent
economic benefits to the ejido as a whole?

As the initiative for such

a grant must come from the community (by petition), someone among the
community members (or someone at least one of them can count on for help)
must know how to write the petition and how to interpret the laws enough
to (a) explain them to the other members, and (b) get the other members
to agree that a land grant would be to their benefit.

Since the majority

of hacienda peones and free villagers are illiterate, and many do not
even speak or understand Spanish, they need one person to interpret for
them and then represent them (by writing and presenting the petition to
the Local Agrarian Commission).

This is what the broker does--organizes

the community to seek ejido status, petitions the government for the community, and often follows the petition through the political channels to
assure its acceptance by the President.
The broker continues to act for the ejido as it seeks new economic
benefits such as piped water, electricity, Ejido Bank credit.

For~

ample, in Hach Pech, Yucat~n, only the schoolteacher knew how to write
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petitions and to send them to the right agencies to get irrigated citrus groves,
piped water, and electricity for the ejido.

This knowledge gained him the au-

thority to play broker between the ejido community and the national agrarian
administration (Press 1969:

212).

How does an individual become the broker in such a situation?

Partly through

playing the other two roles (patron and leader of a power group) but also by
broadcasting his superior knowledge of the national agrarian laws and political
structure (organization plus personal contacts) to the other community members.
This knowledge is based on his superior education to the majority of community
members (a speaking, reading, and writing knowledge of Spanish) and often on his
wider travel experience within and beyond his state.
In short, by assuming that there are individuals on the local level who can
start and carry through the process of gaining a land grant from the President
of Mexico, the law makes it possible for one or a small group of individuals to
play broker between the community and the national agrarian reform structure.
The law makes another assumption which can be interpreted as the need for
someone to play the broker role .

This assumption is that members of an ejido

may be treated not as individual landowners but as a collective block with one
opinion and therefore one spokesman (or one committee of spokesmen).

This

coincides with a further assumption that both the national government and the
local ejido want the ejido to maintain its corporate nature and structural
distance from the national society.
Once the process of land return is begun, the petitioners are organized
into a new governing unit which is granted relative autonomy within the
community.

While the governing board cannot legislate new laws, it is "empowered

to deal with the important local problems that affect the community- -land, water,
education, credit, cooperation, and so forth" (Tannenbaum 1929:

417).

That is,

it has the authority to make policy decisions for all members of the ejido.
The implication of this organization is that by the time an issue leaves

9
the ejido level? it must already be resolved one way or another (not by reporting that a majority support a given issue and a minority oppose it).
local agrarian structure will act only on one opinion.

The supra-

Therefore, the supralocal

structure sees the necessity for only one representative of the ejido.

There is

no need to hear two opinions on one issue (see also Nash 1970).
The fact that many communities have a tradition of consensus decisionmaking
enforces the national conception that there is only one opinion in an ejido
(Miller 1965; Friedrich 1964; Redfield 1950).

This view of one opinion, one

representative gives additional supralocal and, in the case of communities
which favor consensus decisions, local support to one individual acting as
broker for the entire ejido.
Beyond the assumptions of the laws is the actual government structure
which the laws prescribe for an ejido.

Brief examination of the laws can be

used to increase the possibility that one individual could act as broker for
the entire ejido.

Two laws following the ratification of the Constitution

redefined the form of local government to be established in an ejido.
The first, Circular 51 (1922), states that each ejido should elect a
governing board of three, the Ejido Administrative Committee, to receive the
ejido grant and distribute the land to community members, that 20% of the
ejido members have the authority to petition the Delegate to the National
Agrarian Commission to call a new election should the governing board control
too much power, that the ejido should be organized cooperatively to take
maximum advantage of agricultural technology, and that the National Agrarian
Commission should guide ejido programs as well as distribute land (Simpson 1937:
319-320).

Furthermore, Circular 51 provides for the perpetual

community

ownership of forest, brush, and pasture land; and distribution of the products
derived from the land exploited communally in proportion to the amount of
work done (Ibid).
The second, the Law of Ejido Patrimony (1925), modified the above
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format by replacing the Ejido Administrative Committee with the Ejido
Commissariat and the Board of Vigilance.

The Commissariat consists of

three members elected by majority vote every two years.

Its function is

to represent the village on higher administrative levels, to distribute
ejido lands and direct the exploitation of the common properties, to call
meetings, and to carry out the instructions of the community (Ibid: 324).
The Board of Vigilance (three members) is elected every two years to check
the power of the Ejido Commissariat by also having the power to call meetings of the community and by reporting any trouble in the community to
the State and National Agrarian Commission (Ibid:

325).

In communities

where the Ejido Committee is elected by majority vote, the minority group
is supposed to elect the Board of Vigilance.
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In addition, all ejido

land not set aside for common use (i.e., town, pasture, forest) is to be
permanently allotted to individuals whose ownership is limited by not
being allowed to sell, mortgage, or rent it to someone outside the village
(Ibid:

259).

This form of organization is meant to disperse power on the local
level.

But such a goal is easily subverted by not following the laws or

by 'writing' new ones.

This is easily accomplished if an individual or

group of individuals can control the community's understanding of the
laws in the first place.

If the population cannot read, then the inter-

preters of the laws can tell the people what they like and thereby establish their own set of operating rules.

The result is that in some

communities (such as Chan Kom, as will be seen in Section III), the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of government may be concentrated in one person or an individual and his followers.
munities lack a Board of Vigilance.

Many com-

Often control of the government

structure results in monopolization of the broker role between the ejido
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and supralocal government ggencies.

As long as the state or federal govern-

ment cannot or will not check up on· the lQcal ejido,

indi vidy,als can .c on-

tinue t o monopolize the ejido government and theref or e the broker role.
In order to subvert the laws, it is often necessary for an individual to be part of or lead a power group.

A power group is a core of

loyal followers who help their leader fight for control of the decisionmaking process in the ejido.

Each follower is attached to the group

through some dyadic tie to the leader:
ship, economic obligation.

kinship, fictive kinship, friend-

Research in Mexico indicates that a power

group is often made up of two levels, the inner core and an outer ring
of supporters (Miller 1965; Young 1965; Frie drich 1971).
us ua lly consists of members having kin ties to the leader.
(196 4 :

The inner core
Friedrich

194) states that in Naran ja, the .core membe-rs (lO":"30_mep) pFtare

a patronym or matronym with the leader, who is usually the patriarch of
an e xtended family.

In other words, a leader's core group is drawn from

his brothers, sons, nephews, and cousins.
The peripheral (noncore) members of a power group are often drawn
to the leader in his role as patron to individuals (rather than to the
entire ejido). People join the leader's power group because they either
already owe him a favor (taken in the form of political loyalty) (Ceme
1934: 218) or they hope to receive a political or economic reward from
him

(Friedrich 1965, 1971).
The above paragraphs describe what a power group is and how a leader

forms such a group.

But they do not explain why a leader needs a power

group in order to gain control of the local government and therefore the
broker role between the local and supraJ,.oc;.al

governm
~nt st~ uc.tures.

logical reason for a power group is really simple and also buried in
the legal structure of the ejido.

The legal granting of autonomous

T£r ~
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status to the ejido (i.e., treating it as a closed corporate landholding
community) shifts the responsibility for the kind of elections held from
the nationa l government structure to each ejido community.

While the

law states that all positions for office shall be filled by democratic
election, such elections can easily be prevented where there is no supralocal supervision.

Research has shown that, in fact, democratic elections

are usually prevented by coercion through physical threats or threats
of unequal distribution of land, etc.
secret ballot are not democratic.
marked the ballots for the voters.

Elections which are not done by

Cases are reported where officials
Any voter approaching the election
t~

table where the ballot was ma rke d who indi cated a preference other

that held by the officials was told he could not vote as he wished (Foster
1967 ) .

In Zinacant~n, Chiapas, local representatives are elected by men

clustering around their candidate.
rounding him wins (Vogt 1969).

The man with the largest number sur-

But if an iridividual sees the strongest

and most violent men of the community favoring one candidate, might he
not be swayed to join them to prevent them from harming him or his family
and to gain their physical protection?
The result is that in order to gain the cacique status and play the
role of broker, an individual must (and does) use physical force to gain
power.

As he cannot wield enough force alone, he must gather a group of

supporters around him (Miller 1959, 1965; Friedrich 1965).
I have already mentioned that one method of gaining supporters is
to become a patron to them.

To play this third crucial role means that

a man is in the position to grant economic and political favors.

The

granting of economic favors is accomplished by dispensing one's own
wealth to individuals (e.g., giving presents when sponsoring someone's
child at a ceremony--compadrazgo) or by dispensing economic resources
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gained through one's political position.

For example, as local repre-

sentative of the national Ejido Bank, Pedro Caso had the pDwer to withhold or grant government loans to each Naranja ejidatario (Friedrich
1968:

254) .
Political favors are usually official posts granted supporters by

their leader.

These posts are valuable because the incumbent is usually

able to build a political or financial base or both while he is in office
(Siverts 1965).

Once again, in order to be able to dispense political

favors , the leader of a power group must be able to control elections
and the positions open at each election.

A leader can sometimes get an

official p os t in the supralocal hierarchy of gove rnment agencies if he
has pull wi th t he authorities who assign people to such posts.
Patronage, like brokerage, may extend between an individual and
several members of his community, or it may extend to the entire community.

When an individual plays patron to the entire ejido, he is able

to become a cacique.

How is community-wide patronage accomplished?

The law states that the ejido committee has the power to set policy and
distribute ejido plots and water rights every two years.

If an indi-

vidual controls the ejido committee, then he can be seen as the patron
who apportions the land and water.

This is because apportionment is

not done democratically in Assembly but is done autocratically by the
ejido committee (Miller 1965).
choose them.

People are assigned plots; they do not

While all ejidatarios must receive land, there is usually

a wide range in quality and amount of land apportioned, quality being
determined by fertility and proximity to water and the settlement.

Thus

the committee grants favors to its relatives and supporters by giving
them large, fertile fields while it spites its enemies or nonsupporters
by assigning them small fields of low fertility.

As the ejidatarios are

dependent upon land for their livelihood (or else they do not qualify as
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ejidatarios), land apportionment may -ca.uae differentfi.a£-:"W'e-a-lth accumu1ation in a

~6mmunity.

Thus

p~ople

can see that their

pends upon the p1ea.sur.e. or displeas.ure of

a

~ami1y - 1ive1ihood

de-

connnittee, which can often be

a front for the powerof _Qne man.
In summary, while the national laws regarding land grants and ejido
organization were intended to establish democratic control of public po1icy in the ejido, some of them have left room for autocratic control of
public policy because they were ambiguous or misinterpreted.

Misinter-

pretation or modification of these laws could lead to the encouragement
of someone or a group of individuals to play the roles of broker and patron to the entire ejido.

Furthermore , in orde r for an individual to

play these roles to the entire ejido, he needs the backing of a power
group which can help him skirt certain laws, especially the laws concerning democratic election.

I have given some indication that, 10g-

ica11y and empirically, the laws make it possible for an individual and
his supporters to monopolize each role for the entire ejido.

This will

become clear in the following section, where the national political structure is seen to encourage these trends also.

II. Implications of the National Political Structure For the
Achievement of Cacique Status
The national political structure developed after 1917 encouraged
the performance of the three roles in the ejido as much as the laws did.
Furthermore, the national political structure increased the possibility
that one person would play all three roles at one time for the entire
ejido and thereby gain the status of cacique.
Prior to the Revolution, Porfirio D{az changed from president to
dictator of Mexico.
'los

cient~icos'),

Surrounded by a small group of advisors (known as
he dictated the laws to the legislature, executed
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them through his control over the army, and acted as judge in many cases,
including land disputes.

Through absolute control of all three branches

of government, he undermined the principles of the 1856 Constitution and
increas ed t he wealth differentiation within Mexico by favoring the requests of his friends.

His and his advisors' oligarchic power was des-

troyed by the Revolution (1910), which was begun by Madero with the idea
of establishing democratic elections and forbidding any individual from
holding office for two consecutive terms.

Between 1910 and 1924, the

country was constantly wracked by civil war as one individual and his
backers tried to overthrow the incumbent President on the principle that
he was not purs ui ng the two major goals of the Revolution- -demo cr a ti c
election and l and reform.

Once the rebellion of de l a Buerta

(192 3~ 1 9 24J .

was put down, the country settled into relative political stability, i.e.,
political struggle did not take place on the national level.
Following the beginning of political stability came the founding of
the one-party political system.

Basically, the major political party

formed a structure parallel to the government's, with the President of
Mexico heading both.

Both structures were pyramidally shaped, with single

lines extending from one level of organization to the next.

Often the

person in one position of the political structure holds the same position
in the government structure as well.
What is the significance of a one-party national political structure
for the political structure of an ejido community in Mexico?

It means

that in order for an individual to perform one of three roles (broker,
patron, leader of a power group) for the entire ejido, he needs to play
the other two roles also.

In this way, the national political structure

encourages the achievement of the three roles central to cacique status
by one individual.

This will be clear as we examine three major impli-

cations of the one-party structure for the local-level political
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structure.
First, a one-party structure means that political rivalries are resolved within the party before election day.

Therefore elections have

little political meaning, although Foster (1967) suggests that they have
patriotic meaning.

If elections do not determine who gains control of

public (ejido) policy-making (i.e., distribution of land, water rights,
government positions, and other economic benefits), then something else
does.

In Mexico, the 'something else' is either physical force provided

by the supporters of a leader (potential or actual cacique) or physical
force or political support provided by authorities on the suprlocal levels
of the gove r nment and political hierarchies (Hansen 19 71) . Political s upport is in the forms of (a) voting for the leader's candidates , (b) in-fluencin,g others to -yg te for the - leader's - G.at!didates, and (c) fighting
with leader's faction when opposition occurs.
Support from governmental and political superiors is often in the
form of military aid to put down opposition on the part of a competing
faction or of the entire ejido (e.g. Chan Kom, Refield 1950; Tepotzl~n,
Lewis 1949).

Furthermore, the slate of candidates for ejido offices must

be approved by the next highest level of government (Foster 1967:

176).

Therefore, it seems logical that officials would give support to local
leaders by approving the slates which help them keep control of the public policy or by changing the slates until they do.
In order to gain such support, an individual must have active contact with higher-ups.

Such contact is often made when playing the broker

role between the ejido and the higher authorities.

Contact is then re-

inforced (or vice versa) through personal ties such as business partnerships or fictive kinship (compadrazgo).

Of course, using ties to higher

officials to assure support during local-level political contests would
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depend upon the

officia1~

gaining and/or maintaining thei r position in

the political structure.
Up to 1 934 when political struggles on the state or municipal levels often were resolved at elections, the broker for an ejido had much
to offer a candidate on these levels of government--voter support, if the
broker has enough power to control local elections.
the trend in state-level politics again.

This is becoming

During the 1930's-1950's when

there was only one slate of candidates, strength at the polls was still
important for an official's legitimacy, i.e., as a representative of the
people, he had to have a strong showing at the polls.

And physical back-

ing was often necessary t o win a politica l contest b e fore election time.
The local leaders often provided the manpower to win physical contests
on the supra10ca1 level.
One should not forget that while the above description talks in
terms of resolution of political contests, such contests are often not
resolved, i.e., factionalism may cOntinue for decades as in Tepotz1an
(Lewis 1951) or may be resolved in a particularly bloody manner (e.g.,
Friedrich 1966:

212).

It would seem that if political control of an

ejido largely depends on political support of supraloca1 leaders adhering to one party, then whichever local group gets the support of the
hierarchy would easily win the local political contest.

However, it is

not so easy because factional fighting is occurring on the supra10ca1
level also.

A local-level group risks its future by backing one of

these factions, and often the outcome of supra10cal factional fights is
unknown until the last minute (a characteristic of factionalism).

Thus

local-level factions can back the wrong supra10ca1 faction and lose all
their supra10ca1 support.
The second implication of the one-party political structure in
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Mexico is that there is only one line of access to power and political
favors.

When the political and government structures are parallel in

form and overlap in personnel, there are no alternate means to gaining
government posts and to controlling the power which holding such positions
usually entails.

Furthermore, many have noted that the only way to gain

wealth in Mexico is through the same political structure.

And prestige

follows wealth and power.
The significance of this single line of access to power for obtaining the status of cacique of a corporate landholding community is threefold.

First, it means that an entire group of people (ejido) who some-

times have divergent views about what they want and how to get it are
limited to one political representative who doubles as the representative
to the government as well.
members

~re

In a two- or more-party structure, community

not limited to one person to appeal to for help but can go

to the representative of one of several parties.

That is, they have al-

ternative personnel to gain favors from and to give political support to.
Silverman (1964) describes how several political parties and labor unions
in a small farming town in Italy compete for the support of the people by
offering them services, e.g., mediation

and loans.

The competition be-

tween parties blocks anyone group from monopolizing the communication
channels between the community and national government, thereby eliminating the possibility that one individual and his supporters may perform
the broker role for the entire community.
In Mexico, the competition for the broker role is resolved on the
local level before the role is even performed.

That is, political com-

petition takes the form of factionai fights, thus necessitating that a
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potential cacique have a strong power group supporting him.

If one fac-

t ion is not strong enough to eliminate competition, then two factions will
alternate performing the broker role (Friedrich 1966), changing who contro l s the role at each election.

In other words, several factions can-

not represent the people simultaneously;
of this role.

they must alternate for control

This is because there is only one political party powerful

enough to grant the favors sought by the community and by the leaders'
supporters.

This party (PRI) controls the government (who gets office,

which community gets benefits, what the policy is).
The second implication of the single line of access follows from the
first:

The major way f or an individual to ob t a in the political favors

which he then dispenses to the community in his role as patron is to gain
the support of the PRI officials, using his personal ties to them for the
purpose of obtaining such favors for the community.

I have mentioned in

Section I that personal ties are often begun by the individual playing
the broker role between the sup.raI0c a l · offej:ci;;l.ls and the community they
represent.

The point is that, logically speaking, an individual cannot

belong to an opposition party and expect to obtain favors from the party
which controls the government.

In fact, he cannot even back the wrong

(i.e., losing) faction within the PRI and expect to gain political favors.

This was the case in Tapilula where one faction had to leave when

it supported the losing ticket for state candidates (Simpson 1937:

322).

The third import of a single line of access is that if the government and political structures overlap in personnel, then an individual
holding a post in both structures can use the power that is concomitant
with the post he holds in one structure to enhance his or someone else's
position in the other structure.

There are several examples of a muni-

cipal or state government official sending the militia to help a local-
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level leader win a political contest or put down any

community~ide

opposition to him (Lewis 1955; Redfield 1950} .
Once again, the performance of each role helps the individual perform the others:

To become a broker, one must win a factional fight, a

fight which is sometimes resolved by outside support which one gained
while learning or playing the broker role.

Otherwise it is resolved by

the physical strength of one's backers, or power group.

And patronage

follows from one's ties to the proper authorities, ties whiCh were also
often gained through playing the broker role.
The final implication of the one-varty structure is that each level
in the political hie r archy is controlle d by the one above it, thereby enhan cing tight party control.

The result is that local individuals depend

on the officials of the next highest level for pol itical power rather
than on the people in the community whom they supposedly represent.
significance of this situation is obvious.

The

First, if one's political

power does not depend on the people one represents, then local elections
need not be democratic (i.e., by secret ballot).

The literature is full

of examples of elections for ejido and municipal office, none of which
are conducted by secret ballot (Foster 1948:

181; Vogt 1969:

290, etc.).

The result is that the only means by which a community can rid itself
of a bad leader are nonelectory, i.e., by actual or
tion.

Chara ~ ter

assassina-

Friedrich (1966) reports that one cacique of Naranja was assassi-

nated, while Dunwell (1965) reports that the cacique of NavenChauk was
deposed when his opponents forced him into a political contest which he
lost because the state governor refused to back him.
The second significance is the other half of the first-- political
power often depends on the patronage of political superiors.
example illustrates this.

The above

I t has been mentioned that backing the wrong
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patron results in the political downfall and perhapa

ph¥~~cal

expulsion

of a leader and his power group from the community to whiCh they belong.
The hierarchical organization of the one-party structure also means
that, in agrarian Mexico, political power in corporate landholding communities depends on physical force provided by higher officials, support
which is often gained by the performance of the broker role on the part
of the leader.
In conclusion, three major characteristics of a one-party political
structure (political contests are not resolved in secret ballot elections;
there is a single line of access to power and political favors; and political power depends on the support of one's party/government superiors
and one's power group rather than on one's constituents) are seen to increase the possibility that one individual should and could play all three
roles (broker, patron, leader of a power group) to the entire ejido community and thus become cacique to that community.

III.

The Process of Caciquismo:
the Status

Gaining, Maintaining and Losing

I have mentioned in the Introduction that caciquismo is really a
process of one individual gaining, maintaining, and eventually losing
the cacique status.

This status is really a position one holds when one

acts as broker and patron to the entire, or majority of the ejido.

A-

chievement of these two roles depends partly on the backing of a local
power group, of which the cacique is the leader, and partly on the support of politicians operating on the supralocal level.

In the previous

two sections I have indicated that the national laws and one-party political structure together permit the possibility that all three roles are
performed in an ejido and that one person may simultaneously play all
three roles to a community.

In the following section, I wish to illus-
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strate the processual nature of

caciquismo~

i.e.~

that one individual

achieves all three roles and uses eaCh role to advance the other two.
I plan to do this by (a) giving two extensive

examples~

in this case one

life history and one village history, (b) summarizing the process in two
charts which represent other life histories found in the literature, and
(e) organizing other life histories found in the literature into charts

to see whether or not they follow the same process.
The first example is of Eustaquio Ceme, 'Don Eus,' of Chan Kom,
Yucat~n.

His education shows that an individual does not accidentally

become a cacique but carefully learns the roles over the first two to
three decades of his life .

This imp li es tha t caciquismo is not an event

which happens to adults but is a life process whiCh begins in childhood.
Chan Kom was started as a ranCherfa (hamlet) of Ebtun by the father
and uncles of Don Eus (Ceme 1934:

214).

By 1918, the original settlers

were joined by others who helped to make it a hamlet with a two-class
structure.

Its. inhahit-ants were either literate, bilingual (Spanish and

Maya) former leaders of free towns or freed, monolingual (Maya) illiterate, former debt peons from neighboring haciendas which had recently
been closed down by government decree (Redfield 1950:
his relatives belonged to the former group.

8).

Don Eus and

This group of about four

families acted as spokesmen for the rest of the community members.

Thus

Don Eus was born into and reared in the group which monopolized the broker role between the community and the supralocal government and political structures.

This was important, for he was trained as a potential

broker.
Don Eus was prepared for leadership by his uncle and patriarch of
an extended family, Don Fano.

By sending Don Eus with older family mem-

bers on trips to Merida (the capital of Yucat~n), Don Fano gave the boy
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the opportunity to meet and form ties

(co.mp.ad~azgo. ,

friendship, business

acquaintance) with government officials which he could later use to become political broker and economic patron of Chan Kom.

He gave Don Eu s

administrative experience (around 1920) by having him appointed treasurer
of

Ebt~n

during Don Fano's term as Comisario there.

Finally, Don Fano

sent Don Eus on business trips to buy and sell cattle throughout Yucat~n.
These trips taught him to be an entrepreneur to increase his profit
through the careful buying and selling of cattle, and to make contact with
other influential people in the peninsula.
But in order to attain the broker role to an entire community , the
role itself must be nece s s ar y .

In Ch an Kom, the existence of the broker

role depended upon the attainment of ejido and pueblo status for the communi ty, for as long as Chan Kom was a rancherfa within the municipality
of EbtUn, the people of Chan Kom could easily communicate with the officials in Ebtun, thereby making the broker role to the entire community
unnecessary.

Ejido status meant communication in Spanish and sometimes

in writing with an entire government bureaucracy located in the state
capita l, Merida.

This changing status was accomplished by the four lead-

ing families in August, 1926 (Redfield and Villa R. 1934:

29), following

the agrarian reform program established in the 19 17 Constitution and two
Circulars already described (see Section I).
I have already stated that the purpose of the laws was to disperse
power and thereby establish democratic government within the ejido.

But

the leading families did not establish the government organization in
Chan Kom as stated in the Law of Ejido Patrimony as there was no one to
enforce the Law.

Instead, they modified it from an executive committee

of three elected every two years to a comisario and suplente (substitute)
elected annually.

The old comisario would preside over the election and
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was thus able to influence its outcome.

In fact, a vote was rarely taken

as the people knew beforehand who would be the nex t comisario (Ibid:
102-103).

In this way, the law was subverted to allow for oligarchic or

autocratic organization.
Don Eus and his followers were further aided in monopolizing the
broker role by the one-party system whereby all adult males were automatically members of the Liga Local.

The L2ague annually elected five

party officers to represent the pueblo in Merida during the election of
state deputies to the National Congress.

At the party meetings, the of-

ficers established contact with state and municipal politicians, thereby
positioning themselves to be able to control what news and ideas got
filtered down to the pueblo.
How were the leading families able to modify the application of
national law in Chan Kom and get away with it?

First, they were the only

literate Spanish-speakers in Chan Kom and therefore had the ability and
authority to interpret the law to their fellow villagers.

Since the other

people could not read, they had no way of challenging the leaders' interpretation of agrarian law.

That is, the leading families used their

superior knowledge-.to gain the authority to interpret law.

Second, the

leaders had already assumed the broker role by establishing contact with
officials in Merida.

Because Chan Kom was physically isolated in the

1920's, there was no one else for the people to consult than the leading
families.

Third, Chan Kom followed the practice of consensus decisions

(Redfield 1950).

In order to achieve consensus, some force was used.

Those who disagreed with the policy of the leaders stayed away from the
Assembly.
Don Eus also began to learn how to perform the patronage role with
the initial aid and continual guidance of Don Fano.

By supporting his
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uncle (working for him, political loyalty) and emphasizing their kin bond,
Don Eus got Don Fa:g,o to start him in business (cattle ranching).

By build-

ing his own economic base, Don Eus was then in a position to lend money,
sponsor a fiesta, and give gifts, thus gaining a reputation as economic
patron (Ceme 1934:

218).

From this position he started accumulating peripheral supporters to
the power group in which he belonged (by virtue of his birth and continued
loyalty to his uncle).

Through his economic patronage, he made people

obligated to repay his patronage in kind (by repaying the loans or giving l abor) or in political loyalty.

In this way, he gained local sup-

porters who formed the peripheral part of his power group.

Here, kin-

ship is translated into wealth and wealth into political power.
By the time Don Eus was in his late 20's, he had already learned how
to perform the three roles.

The next 30-40 years were spent trying to

gain sole control of these roles.

He accomplished this by gaining par-

tial control of each role, then by using his performance of each role to
achieve the complete control of the others.
He started to attain partial control of the broker role by gaining
political office and using the office to boost his power base.

In 1928,

he was elected both Ejido Commissariat President and Liga President
(Ceme 1934:

223).

This meant that he was the first to have the power

to distribute ejido land in Chan Kom.

He placed the leading families

around the plaza and blocked others from getting land there.

Because

the plaza is the focus of trade, political action and religious activity,
a house on the plaza has important consequences (Redfield and Villa R.
1934:

66).
By holding the office of Liga President, Don Eus was responsible

and visible to the PRI o-ff ici_als

in Merida.

By 1929, he was elected
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comisario; he was reelected in 1931.

The combination of holding these

offices with being part of a politically powerful family gave Don Eus
the opportunity to enhance his broker status.

Now he had the authority

to represent Chan Kom in municipal, department, and state meetings.

The

result is that he gained additional opportunity to act as the communication channel between the two levels of government.

Furthermore, he was

part of the power group which controlled all the offices, making decisions
for and enforcing them on the community.5

They were able to accomplish

the latter because they controlled the police force and means of punishment through the assignment of communal labor.

Eventually they forced

the rest of the community into an apolitical, passive role by reducing
the powers of the General Assembly, by keeping the rest of the population
from accumulating wealth through unremunitive labor, and by heavy taxation.
In 1935 the necessity for the role of broker between the entire community and the government hierarchy was guaranteed when Chan Kom became
the cabecera, or seat of a new municipality.

This meant that if any

citizens wanted to appeal the actions of Chan Kom's leaders to higher
government authorities, they would have to go to Merida and deal with the
state officials rather than to Cuncunul and the municipal officials.

This

made appeal more difficult, for the physical and structural distance was
greater; the language barrier and culture gap between the state authorities and peon milperos practically blocked communication.
broker became even more necessary and powerful.

The role of

This is because instead

of being under the control of a cabecera, Chan Kom would only have to
answer to M~rida and would have rancher!as under its control (Redfield
1950:

20).

An additional advantage was that the municipal officers

received government salary whereas pueblo officers did not (Goldkind
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1966:

332).
Don Eus and his power group took immediate advantage of the new

status by getting Don Eus elected the first municipal President (Goldkind 1965:

872).

In this way, the men of the principal families con-

tinued to make policy for Chan Kom and extended their control to the
surrounding pueblos which were assigned to the municipality.

Because

Don Eus now represented a municipality rather than a mere pueblo when
he went to the state capital, his political power and prestige increased
there (Redfield 1950:

87).

Thus the structural necessity for a broker

and Don Eus' role as sole broker for the community was assured.
During the same period, Don Eus was working toward becoming head of
the most potent power group in Chan Kom.

Achievement of this role was

synonymous with transferring control of the village from a group of leading families to his own family.

By the early 1930's, these families had

split into factions, with the Ceme family becoming the core of one of
them.

By 1938, the opposing faction lost a political contest, giving as

the reason for their defeat the fact that they had "failed to enlist the
aid of the outside government" against the Cernes (Ibid:

104).

Thus Don

Eus' supporters must have used outside political pull to destroy their
competition for complete control of the village.

The result was that

the losing faction emigrated, leaving the Ceme faction as the sole
er group with any clout in Chan Kom.

pow-

Also in the 1930's the previous

head of the Ceme supporters, Don Fano, must have died and Don Eus assumed
full leadership of the group.

Thus there existed one power group with

Don Eus at its head by 1940.
The Cernes under Don Eus' leadership continued to squash any opposition to their rule from the 1940's through the 1960's (Redfield 1950:
20;

Go~dkind

1966:

339).

Some of their methods included borrowing
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federal troops to put down a rebellion, forcing opponents to emigrate, and
controlling immigration to keep down the number of literate people who
could qualify f or public office.
By the 1960's, the cacicazgo pattern was solidified and centered
around Don Eus.

A teacher who formerly taught in Chan Kom explained that:

All political power is in the hand of Don Eus and his
relatives. Whatever they decide to do is what happens.
They respect no principle but their own advantage. They
calculate every action. They will do anything for money
and nothing if it gains them no money.
(Goldkind 1966: 340)
Traveler~

reports indicated the process was completed when Don Eus

died in the late 1960 's.
of h is death.

No on e h as r e por ted t he political implications

But Don Eus' life history illustrates that ( a ) caci qui smo

depends upon the simultaneous performance of three roles, (b) playing one
of these three roles helps one get in the position to play the others,
and (c) the national laws and national political structure increase the
possibility that one can attain the cacique status.

The same pattern

emerges in the political history of Naranja (sometimes referred to as

,

Durazno), a Tarascan pueblo of longstanding (Friedrich 1964:

195).

The collected works of Friedrich cover the political history of this
town from the 1890's through 1963, giving a clear picture of both the
continuity of leader$hip within one family extended matri- and patrilineally (usually the sister's son becomes next cacique) and of the connection between the post-Revolutionary cacique's power base and the new
agrarian laws and national political structure.

All four men (~oaqu{n

de la Cruz, Primo Tapia, Ot~n, Pedro Caso) organized their power groups
around the issue of agrarian reform in the pueblo.

The first, Joaquin

de la Cruz, was the son of the village leader, Ambrosio de la Cruz.

He

began agitating for agrarian reform when he first entered law school in
1888 and continued his battle on the local level when he returned to
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Naranja to collect and educate a small group of followers in the problem.
His views were not new in the area; many were discussing agrarian reform
in neighboring towns at this time.

He was significant in that he was lo-

cal and he tried to get the legal deeds necessary to return Naranja's
stolen land to the community (it had been given to a wealthy family for
establishing an hacienda by D{az; Friedrich 1971:

55).

He eventually

left Naranja to become a state judge until his assassination in 1919
(Ibid:

52-57).

Upon Joaquin's death, his maternal nephew Primo Tapia returned from
his long sojourn with the IWW in the U.S. to take over instituting land
reform in Naranja (1920).

He did so by . first gaining leadership over the

core group of supporters of his dead uncle Joaqu{n, the majority of whom
were kin (cousins, nephews) to Primo (Ibid:

79).

Friedrich says that

Primo was accepted as leader because he was considered one of the family
and because his supporters felt that he could push through reforms which
would help them make economic gains (Ibid:

89).

In other words, Primo

was accepted as head of a power group' ,because members of that group felt
(a) he could best perform the broker role between them and the agrarian
officials in order to achieve agrarian reform, and (b) he would then
patronize his supporters (themselves) with the fruits of agrarian reform-land and political office.

Most of his supporters were not qualified

for playing the broker role simply because they could not speak/read
Spanish (Ibid:

90).

Primo soon proved that he was capable of performing the broker role
when (1921) he took the signatures of

Naranje~os

(gathered for another

purpose) to the state capital and petitioned for an ejido grant (Ibid:
92).

Friedrich remarks later that the grant went through relatively

rapidly, partly because of Primo's connections with the ruling politi-
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cians of the state at that time (Ibid:

101).

Primo further assured his

success by organizing the entire Zacapu region into a League of Agrarian
Communities to act as a power base from which to push for reform.
When the ejido grant was passed for Naranja and the surrounding communities, Primo's followers held the important governmental posts in Naranja and were elect.e d ejido officers.

Since Circular 51 had been passed

before Naranj.a received its ejido grant, the land grant also meant the
es t ablishment of a dual local government, consisting of civil (executive
committee) and ejidal (Ejidal Commissariat) branches (Friedrich 1964:
20 1) .

While the format imposed two sets of officials, of meetings and

of e l ections on Naranja's political organization, the re was nothing to
stop Tapia from holding top office in both branches:

comisario of the

executive committee and chairman of the Ejidal Commissariat (Ibid:

202).

In fact, Friedrich adds that "men in both arms of government often work
as a group, at times flexibly switching roles"

(Ibid:

201).

Primo and his followers were the ones to organize the village into
communal farming teams and to apportion the harvest to each participant
(ejidatarios and hired labor from other towns) in the £armwork (Friedrich
1971:

126).

What is important here is that once the land grant went

through, Primo automatically became patron to the entire ejido through
the grant and through his followers' dispensation of the harvest.

He

also became patron to his followers by getting them elected to local
offiae and by granting them extra shares of the harvest for cash crops,
the r progeeds of which ostensibly went to "further the agrarian cause"
(Ibid:

119).

In other words, Primo's followers got their first pay-off

with the very first harvest.

During 1926, Primo brought additional ben-

efits to the ejido when he established a primary school, a cooperative
clothing store, and cooperative poultry farm.

He also lIinitiated the
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construction of new roads, dykes, and canals in the ejido" (Ibid:

126).

Primo continued to work for agrarian reform in the ejido until his assassination in 1928.

His story illustrates how one man could achieve not only

local control but also regional control through the amassing of the three
roles.

It should be noted, however, that just as Primo was no ordinary

village cacique, so he amassed power in a slightly different way from
Don Eus.

That is, Primo was regional cacique before ejido status was

granted to Naranja and before he played the role of patron to the entire
community (although he obviously was rewarding his followers throughout
his 1920-1925 campaign for agrarian reform).

This was possible because

he had amassed such a large, regional power base.
The story of Naranja now continues and may best be seen from the
point of view of the life history of a later cacique, Pedro Caso.
was born in 1911.

Pedro

His mother was the niece of Primo Tapia and the sister

of Oton, Tapia's favorite nephew whom he groomed for eventual leadership
and who had eventually succeeded Tapia as Naranja cacique in the 1940's
(Friedrich 1964:

,

195).

In turn, Pedro became the favorite nephew of his

uncle Oton and was prepared for leadership by him.

While playing mes-

senger for his great-un-cle Tapia, Pedro expanded his- connections to the
neighboring local leaders.

Thus he started his 'career' with the basis

for playing two of the three roles, potential head of a (family-based)
power group because he was born into a powerful family and was trained
by its leaders, and broker because he was taught to read and write Spanish and to establish connections with neighboring political leaders.
By the time Pedro was in his teens, his great-uncle had brought the
national government's plan for local organization to Naranja and had
started connecting Naranja's and the family's political future to state
officials/politicians.

After the Calles government had Tapia assassi-
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nated (Friedrich 1966:

210), a series of factional fights resulted as

Tapia's support group struggled to keep control of the ejido.

However,

the old power group lost, and the opposition group led by the Roca family
gained control of the ejido from 1929 to 1935.

At that time, they backed

the wrong ticket for national President and state officials and were
forced to flee Naranja (30 families), leaving Pedro's family in control
again (Friedrich 1964:

195).

During the time of factionalism and Roca control (1926-1935), Pedro
was in Morelos, studying in school and learning the political ropes.

While

there, he participated in a communist cell and must have learned the laws,
for he was able to quote whole sections of the Constitution and the Agrarian Code ( passed in 1932) later on.
family financial backing.

He was able to study because h e had

This phase of his life helped prepare him for

the role of broker because he gained knowledge of the system to interpret
it to the illiterate Naranj a inhabitants and made contact with the political elite of the state.

After studying, Pedro taught primary school through-

out the state of Michoac~n and did not return home until 1938.
During 1935-1936, the Casos controlled Naranja.
competing factions.

Then they split into

By 1939, the faction led by Ot~n (Pedro's sponsoring

uncle) won the fight--after 21 murders were committed (Friedrich 1966:
During the struggle, Pedro returned home and backed his uncle.

212).

When Ot~n

won the factional fight, Pedro received certain benefits which enabled him
to start performing the three essential roles for Cacique.

Ot~n apportioned

him great tracts of land from which he cultivated and built his wealth.
This started Pedro to becoming an economic patron to individual members of
the community.

His uncle started appointing Pedro to government offices

in the pueblo.

Because of his greater knowledge of the laws and his con-

tacts with the state political leaders, Pedro was able to use these offices

. -.

~-
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-

-

-

placed himself in the · P9sition:"::-o £-->-potential -leader of that

fa ~tion.

He helped

build the rep ut ation of the faction by personally gaining the reputation
of a killer, thus making him a dangerous and powerful man in the area
(Friedrich 1968:

252) •

.,

In 1941, Oton was elected President of the Naranja Ejidal Commissariat and thereby gained the power to distribute ejido land.

Ot6n was

ab l e to legally expropriate the land of the losing faction by, first,
kil l ing one of its members and blocking the others from working in their
fields for 2 years and, second, by invoking the law which states that
an individual's land reverts b ack to the community if he fails to cultivate it for two years.

Ot6n then distributed the expropriated land to

members of his faction (Friedrich 1965:

129) •

.#

By 1952, Oton had gained

enough backing to be elected President of the executive committee (Ibid:
131) •

The higher the position of OtOn became, the higher Pedro could rise
in the political hierarchy of the ejido.

Pedro had become the third

wealthiest man in Naranja by 1956, when Ot~n had established himself as
cacique there.

Pedro invested his surplus income in the education of his

children, in "outside political investments in the state chapter of the
Masons," and in PRI.

Such investments could gain him political support

in the future.
Furthermore, during the 1950's Pedro was gaining control of activities which were central to performing the three roles.

He took on one of

the key positions from which to play the broker role when he became the
local representative of the Ejido Bank, controlling who would receive
government loans in the community.

Furthermore, he became a covert

judge, an arbiter of intracommunity disputes because he knew the laws and
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the Tarascan speech of reconciliation by heart (Ibid).

He performed the

functions of the municipal and district courts to save the people court
expenses, jail sentences, and fines (Ibid:
and patronage himself .

254), and to pocket the fees

His method of arbitration was informal but his

method of enforcement was effective, for he had backers to force others to
comply with his decisions.

His backers were his own half-brothers 'although

they all were nominally supporting Ot~n.
By the mid-1950's, Pedro was not performing the final role, heading
a power group.

Although he was "one of the principal elements who dic-

t ated to the pueblo," he was blocked from achieving this role and becoming cacique by the fact that Ot~n was holding that post (Friedrich 1968 :
257).

Perhaps t h i s i s why Pedro and Ot6n "could har dly s t and each other"

(lbid:

258).

left town.

In 1959, Otdn was murdered, and Pedro and his half-brothers

But in 1963 "the man who had been senator during Pedro's term

as alternate was elected governor.

Within months, the rebellious faction

was dispersed, and Pedro, now sole leader of the Casos, returned to 'direct
the destinies of his pueblo" (Friedrich 1968:

258).

He remained cacique

from 1963 to 1966 when he died from a heart attack.
Pedro Caso's life history parallels Don Eus'.

Both were raised to

leadership roles in their communities by families which were already prominent members.

Both took several decades to achieve the status of cacique

and did so by first playing the roles of broker, patron, and member of a
power group to some people in the community, then by using the power base
built from one role to increase their control of the other two.

Eventually,

they both became sole brokers and patrons for their communities and heads
of the power group in which they had always been members.
The following two charts are meant to show that the similarity between Don Eus' and Pedro Caso's lives is not coincidence but is exem-
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plary of the entire pattern of the caciquismo process in many twentiethcentury corporate landholding Mexican communities.

It will be noted

that while the last stages of both cl1arts coincide, the initial stages
differ according to how the potential cacique enters the community, as
a member born and/or raised there or as an outsider who joins the community already in a position of authority.
(see Tables I and II, following)
The following two charts (Tables III and IV) summarize the literature that gives enough information on life histories of twentieth-century Mexican caciques to fill or partially fill the chart.

Those reports

giving sufficient data to block out the chronological development of the
men are marked with alphabetical order following chronological order.
Those reports which are not complete enough are marked simply by checkmarks, indicating that the individual went through certain stages, but
the order in which he went through these stages is not clear from the
literature.
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Table 1:

Chronological Ordering of the Process
of Attaining the Cacique Status by a
Man Born into the Community Which He
Eventually Controls

Stage I: Gain an education
-speak/write/read Spanish
-start making contact with
supralocal officials
-learn agrarian laws
(preparation for broker
role)
Stage II: Start accumulating
wealth
(preparation for patron role)
State III: Prepare for leadership of a power group by maintainingmembership in an already
existing group (often one's
extended family) and gaining
peripheral members through
-patronage based on distribution of own wealth
-promised patronage when
public office is achieved:
jobs, better land, more
irrigated water, etc.
Stage IV: Start using contacts
on supralocal level of political/
government structure to help win
local political contests for oneself and one's power group. This
is partly done by knowing to pick
a ~Yinning leader on the supralocal
level and by playing client to
one's backers.

Stage V: Use public office to
-increase personal wealth and
w.ealth of members of one's
. power group
-act as broker between community
and upper echelon on some or all
issues
-act as patron to the community
by distributing political favors
obtained from upper echelon,
making clear that the community
would not have received these
benefits without one's help
-block opposition from galnlng
control of any of the above roles
by using the physical support
of one's power group and the
physical/political support of the
supralocal officials
Stage VI: Gain leadership of one's
power group by destroying opposition
or waiting one's turn as s uccessor
to the present leader
Stage VII: Convert temporary control
of 1 or a few local offices into
permanent control of all offices by
oneself and one's supporters in order
to monopolize control of patron and
broker roles to the entire community
Stage VIII: Declare oneself or be
referred to as cacique of the community
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Table II:

Chronological Ordering of the Process of
Attaining the Cacique Status by a Man Not
Born into the Community He Eventually Controls but Who Enters the Community in a
Position of Leadership (e . g., Schoolteacher)

Stage I: Get an education
-speak/write/read Spanish
-know agrarian and civil
laws
-start making contacts with
state or municipal leaders
where one will work (optional
if the move is postponed
until post-education years)
Stage II: Move to community one
will eventua lly con trol but in a
role of poten tia l power (brokerage
power), e.g. s choolteacher in a
bi lingual or monolingual community
Stage III: Start or continue
establishing ties with supralocal
officials through one's official
position in the community. At the
same time
-start playing patron and
broker to individuals in the
community by acting as liason
between them and government
officials in a capacity which
uses one's knowledge but not
necessarily one's official
position (e.g., act as translator for Indians in muni.c ipal
or regional court)
-start accumulating wealth by
having people pay for the
services one performs
-start gathering a support group
by acting as their spokesman,
organizer, broker, patron

Stage IV: Gain official control
of public office by securing offices
for one's supporters
Stage V: Use control of public
offices to
-increase personal wealth and that
of one's supporters
-act as broker between community
and supralocal hierarchy on some
or all issues
- act as pa t r on t o t he community
by distribu t ing pol i tical favors
obtained from supralocal officials
-block opposition from gaining
control of any of the above roles
by using the physical support of
one's power group and the physical/
political support of the supralocal officials
Stage VI: Convert temporary control
of 1 or a few local offices by one's
supporters into permanent control of
all offices in order to monopolize
control of patron and broker roles
to the entire community
Stage VII: Declare oneself or be
referred to as cacique of the
community
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Table III:

Histories of · Caciques Eorn into the
Community They Eventually Control
(Stages Correspond to those of
Table 1)
. .. . . .

Name .

..

Appeared . in

1968

... .

.. ..

III

Stages
IV V VI

I

II

a

b

b

c

d

c

d

b

e

x

x

x

Ot6n Caso

Friedrich 1965

M. O.

Siverts 1965

a

M. M.

Vogt 1969 ·

a

M.

Edel 1962

a

?

b

?

Don Alonso

Miller 1959 1965

a

b

c

d

VII

VIII

f

e

g

f

g

h

x

x
x

e

f

g

h
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Table IV:

Histories of Caciques, Not Born into
the Community They Eventually Control
(Stages Correspond to Those in Table II)

Stages
Name

Appeared in

I

II

Maestro de
escuela de
Tzo'ontahal

Nash 1970

a

b

cc5'tnez

Press 1969

a

b

III

IV

V VI

VII

c

d

e

f

g

c

d

e

f

g
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lV. Summary and Conclusion
Analysis. of the literature on caciquismo (political bossism) in post1917 Mexican ej ido communities indicates that (a) caciquismo is a life process
started in childhood ' and completed when an individual has become sole broker
and patron to his community as well as leader of a power group, and (b) some
of the national laws concerning agrarian reform and the national political
structure (as it developed into a one-party structure) have been factors
in encouraging the continuation of this type of political organization on
the local level.

These conclusions have been based on a discussion of the

logical implications of some agrarian laws and of the national political
structure,which was then illustrated by case studies wherever possible to
show that the logical possibilities have been used by actual or potential
caciques.
Briefly, the laws outlining how a community is to obtain an ejido
grant and how that grant is to be administered make it necessary for there
to be a broker between the community and agrarian bureaucracy and for one
person to play that role for an entire community.

Being in the position of

broker means that the individual plays client to his bureaucratic and
political superiors while he plays patron to his inferiors, i.e., the
rest of the community.

This is because as sole distributor of benefits

from his superiors, he makes the community feel that without him (and his
personal connections to his superiors), the community would not receive the
benefits of a land grant, piped water, electriCity, Ejido Bank credit,
etc.

All are limited goods which must be apportioned among many rural

communities.

While the goal of Mexico is to provide these services to all

rural communities, achievement of that goal takes time, and there is no
rule (e.g., greatest need) to determine which communities get awarded
these benefits before others.
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The national political structure further influences the continuation
of caciquismo within ej ido connnunities.

A one-party structure means. that

political contests are usually res.olved Defore elections; thus, in order
to get elected, an individual needs. a power group behind him to provide
physical force and political contacts with superiors (on the supralocal
level) which in turn determine political force (on the local level).

Thus,

to become elected and therefore eligible to play the broker and patron
roles to the community, a man needs the support of a power group and
eventually must head it in order to control it.

A one-party structure also

means that there is only one line of access to power and to political favors
(i.e., economic benefits to the community and political patronage to an
individual and his followers).

As a result, only one man and his support

group (the one who monopolizes the line of access) will be able to play
patron to the community at one time.

Finally, a one-party structure implies

an overlap in personnel between the administration (bureaucracy) and
party officials.

The implication of this is that an individual with power

in one hierarchy (governmental or political) can use it to boost his power
in the other.
The final section of this paper (Section III) is a summary and analysis

of the literature on life histories of twentieth-century Mexican caciques
in ejido communities.

The purpose of this section has been to illustrate

my point that caciquismo is a process of attaining, maintaining, and
eventually losing the status of cacique.
The major reason for describing caciquismo as a process is that it

points out that attainment of the cacique status is really

synonymou~

with

achievement of three roles--patrori and broke~r .-to ..,the -entire community, and
leader of a power group.

Such analysis clarifies the connection between
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the agrarian laws, national poli.ti.c al structure, and caciquismo.

That is,

the continuation of caciquismo in twentieth.,..-century Mexican ejido
communities despi.te continued government: opposition appears to be encouraged
by some of the laws and the politi.c al structUl;,e.
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NOTES

1.

An earlier version of this paper was published iIi. AmericaIIi.digena
37:4:851- 81 (December, 1977) under the title, "El Caciquismo en el
ejido post-revolucionario."

2.

Gibson (1964: 36) notes that cacique is an Arawak term adopted by
the conquering Spaniards who used it to refer to the leaders of a
settlement.

These leaders were used as middlemen between the Indian

settlement and the Spanish rulers, the sole means of cormnunication
between the two leve ls of society .
3.

An 'ejido gran t' fol l owing the Revolution refers to a land grant
to adult male agriculturalists in a cormnunity by the national
government (President of

Me~ico).

This grant is in the name of the

cormnunity and is inalienable to that cormnunity except by Presidential
decree.

Individuals have usufruct rights to the land as long as they

are cultivating it and may pass the land to their wives, children or
children-in-law, but they cannot sell it.

4.

Yucatan and some other states also established an agrarian union,
the Liga de Resistencia, which includes all villages and hacienda
laborers and is meant to function as a regional grievance board by
the ejidatgrios (Tannenbaum 1929:416).

5.

Dunwell (1965) reports that the man \.;rho had been cacique of Navenchauk before 1962 based his power on his control of the ejido cormnittee
for over 20 years.
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